


SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT IN SUDAN



A LEXICON OF HATE SPEECH TERMS



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About the Partner Organizations: **Andariya** is a bilingual, digital cultural multimedia platform and cross-cultural enterprise serving Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda and expanding into the continent. Andariya strives to create pioneering, innovative, multi-faceted digital platforms and cross-cultural exchange and research projects to uplift and connect Africans across the continent and diaspora. Andariya was launched in February 2015 by Omnia Shawkat and Salma Amin and has grown to a community of more than 120 people working to make it a consistent and worthwhile contribution to contemporary digital cultural documentation. The platform covers grassroots issues, with a mix of positive and critical perspectives on gender, tech, arts and culture. Andariya operates on a hybrid social enterprise model, with research and digital content and strategy consulting as well as grants for creative projects.

Founded in 1996, the Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA) is a non-governmental, non-profit organization working for peace, development, and good governance in Sudan. The organization works with a broad cross-section of actors and stakeholders developing programs and providing services that center around peacebuilding and human security, natural resource management and environmental conservation, democracy, and human rights promotion. Youth engagement, innovation, and sustainable livelihoods represent cross-cutting themes in the work of the organization.

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Introduction

PeaceTech Lab has focused on the problem of hate speech throughout the world since its founding in 2014. This “lexicon” of hate speech terms concerning Sudan represents the Lab’s 10th lexicon focused on online media and hateful speech. It identifies key terms in Sudan’s online discourse and analyzes their origins, context, and influence at a pivotal moment in the country’s history: from a popular revolution bringing forth a political transition to elections and civilian rule. As such, it represents a snapshot of the problem of hate speech amidst a profound social and political transition. As UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres told the UN Human Rights Council in February 2019:

Hate speech is a menace to democratic values, social stability and peace. It spreads like wildfire through social media, the Internet, and conspiracy theories. It is abetted by public discourse that stigmatizes women, minorities, migrants, refugees and any so-called “other.” Indeed, hate is moving into the mainstream – in liberal democracies and authoritarian States alike.¹

PeaceTech Lab, in partnership with Andariya and the Sudan Development Initiative (SUDIA), intends this effort to contribute to understanding language and the context for potential conflict during the transition to civilian government and to eventual elections in Sudan. This project seeks to tackle the problem of identifying and contextualizing the particular type of language that’s likely to cause violence. Rather than assessing the existence or prevalence of hateful speech, this project instead examines the terms, their origins and context, and their use in a particular country context. To successfully monitor and counter hateful speech, we must first identify specific terms and the social and political context that makes them offensive, inflammatory, or even potentially dangerous. This research also seeks to identify alternative language that would mitigate or counter the impact of this speech and thereby contribute to building peace in the country. Finally, this resource intends to inform other individuals and organizations involved in monitoring and countering hateful speech in Sudan so that their work can be more effective. It will also contribute to the overall body of knowledge on this issue and inform other efforts around the globe. The appendices at the end of the report includes a description of the project’s research structure, methodology, and implementation.



By Muhammad Daffa Rambe - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=16093732>

The Lexicon

To compose this lexicon, the project team (comprising staff and consultants of PeaceTech Lab, and the Sudanese civil society organizations Andariya and SUDIA) conducted an online survey of Sudanese to identify offensive and inflammatory terms used online. Approximately 330 individuals responded to this survey, helping the team to identify the terms and contextual information synthesized below. After an initial draft of terms was prepared, workshops were held in several modes — online, telephonic, and face-to-face — with participants from several regions across Sudan in order to evaluate the terms, provide qualitative analysis and further contextual information, and contribute additional terms not previously identified (see Appendix B).

For each term, the “Definition” section contains information provided by survey respondents, workshop participants, and in-depth interviewees about the term’s origins, general meaning, and related information. The “Why it is offensive/inflammatory” section discusses information that respondents and participants provided as to why they believed the term was offensive and inflammatory, including past usages, historical references to past conflict, and other contextual information. Finally, the “Alternative words that could be used” section lists terms provided by respondents and participants that they thought could be used in place of the offensive and inflammatory terms or to mitigate or counter those terms. In some cases, the respondents and participants didn’t provide alternative terms or didn’t determine that any were constructive or relevant. Further discussion about the survey, workshops, and other aspects of the project’s methodology can be found in the appendices below.

Country Context: The Republic of Sudan in 2020

Origins

Civilization in the lands of what is currently the Republic of Sudan goes back millennia as the land fostered some of the earliest human communities on earth and architectural wonders of the world. One of the largest countries by land area in Africa, Sudan is also one of the most culturally, ethnically, and regionally diverse; its geographic location enabled influences from the Arab and Muslim worlds to mix with African traditions and heritage. In the 7th century, Arab Muslims conquered Egypt and raided Nubia; by the 1500s, black Muslims controlled the areas of Sudan, followed by further settlement of Sudan by other black peoples. Over the next two centuries, these people increasingly adopted an Arabic identity. This interaction with the Arab world also brought commerce — including the slave trade — which while not unknown to these lands, established the dynamic of slaves used as domestic servants in the north.² While Khartoum and its political class have been dominated by ethnic Arab Muslim leaders over the last 200 years, non-Arab Muslims have predominated in the west and southwest, and non-Arab, non-Muslims populated the regions of what is now South Sudan. Sudanese national identity and state institutions trace their origins to the efforts of the Mahdists and principally to al-Mahdi who, in his efforts to restore Islam, mobilized followers throughout the regions of Sudan to push out the ruling Egyptians and the British forces sent to help them in order to establish a seat of empire in Omdurman. However, he and his successors' formal rule ended with British conquest of Khartoum in 1896-1898. During Anglo-Egyptian rule from 1899 to 1956, Arabic language and Islam featured in the northern regions, while the British facilitated access by Christian missionaries to the south.³ Nearly 500 ethnic groups speaking 400 languages and dialects live within Sudan's borders today.⁴ Additionally, it is a young and growing country as nearly two-thirds of Sudan's estimated 45 million people are under the age of 24.⁵

This research focuses on issues of contemporary Sudan and refers to aspects of modern Sudanese history to the extent that they are relevant to the contemporary situation. Modern Sudan has been wracked with instability or conflict almost continuously since its independence in 1956. There have been two main themes to these conflicts: capturing and controlling the central government in Khartoum; and, maintaining dominance and control over the regions. Sudan experienced several coups in its first 30 years; at the same time, the central government either dominated or neglected the peripheral regions, leaving them politically, economically, and ethnically marginalized — a dynamic begun under British colonial administration.

Rebellion, Coups, and Two Civil Wars

In 1955, southerners rebelled against the Anglo-Egyptian authorities then ruling Sudan because of actions affecting the south, in particular, placing southern regions under northern rule and excluding southerners from the civil service. The resulting First Sudanese Civil War ended after 17 years of fighting and the south having achieved partial self-government under the Addis Ababa agreement. This arrangement was never fully accepted by the Sudanese government as President Nimeiri (who had come to power in a coup in 1969) abrogated the agreement by dividing up the southern region. Consequently, civil war returned to the south in 1983 when the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang, launched an armed campaign to re-make Sudan — this came to be known as the Second Sudanese Civil War. That same year, President Nimeiri decreed that Sharia Islamic Law would be introduced throughout the country. In 1985, following mass popular demonstrations, Nimeiri was deposed and replaced with a Transitional Military Council which organized elections resulting in a coalition government headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi.⁶ However, the parliamentary government of Sadiq al-Mahdi

didn't last. By 1989, military officers backed by the National Islamic Front (NIF) took power, installing a radical Islamic regime in the country and governing as the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation. However, the military-Islamist alliance was an uneasy one as fissures between the two power blocs had already begun by the time Brigadier Omer al-Bashir was installed as President in 1993. In 1996, the parliament was re-instituted with NIF leader Hassan al-Turabi as speaker; two years later, the National Congress Party (NCP) was formed and a new constitution was endorsed in a referendum. In 1999, however, al-Bashir took on the NIF directly by declaring a state of emergency, jailing al-Turabi, and dissolving the national assembly.⁷

In 2002, after nearly 20 years of war in which an estimated 2 million Sudanese died, Sudan signed the first of a series of agreements with the SPLM that culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005. While this ended one of the longest wars on the continent, in February 2003, rebel groups in Darfur in western Sudan took up arms against similar predation and neglect by the central government. As it had done so against the south, the government responded with harsh, scorched-earth tactics, in this case using helicopter gunships and irregular forces (known as “janjaweed”) to suppress the rebels and kill civilians. While Sudan allowed the African Union (AU) to send peacekeeping troops to Darfur in 2004, the force was equipped to do little more than monitor. A ceasefire was signed in 2005 and the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement followed, but due in part to the fact that there were several factions amongst the rebels, an end to the fighting was not achieved until 2011. Nonetheless, a joint UN-AU force remains on the ground even today as the security situation remains unsettled and local governance remains in transition. More than 200,000 Darfurians died directly or indirectly from the fighting and 2 million have been displaced, including 200,000 to neighboring Chad.

The South Gains Independence and al-Bashir Faces Protests

In 2009, al-Bashir became the first sitting president to be indicted by the International Criminal Court after the role he played in the genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur. While this contributed to his and Sudan's pariah status, limited his travels abroad, and reduced his legitimacy somewhat at home, it didn't dramatically affect the regime's orientation. Even after a second warrant was handed down a year later, the regime remained unchanged.⁸ Meanwhile, as provided in the CPA, southerners prepared for a referendum to determine their future. In January 2011, they voted overwhelmingly to secede from Sudan. Six months later, that referendum took effect and South Sudan became the newest member of the world of nations. This was not only a stunning blow to Sudanese sovereignty and identity but would prove to be a threat to its economy — in a dispute the following year, South Sudan cut off the flow of oil to Sudan. Additionally, while the south has officially seceded, uncertainty remains as a border dispute between the two countries is still not settled. The status of the contested Abyei Area also needs to be settled and has resulted in a 4,400-strong UN security force deployment there. With the nearly 8,000-strong joint UN-African Union force still on Darfur, there are some 12,000 international troops still in Sudanese territory.

After South Sudan's independence and the oil shock, public protests emerged, first in Khartoum in 2012 and again then in late 2013 as Sudanese students, women, and others took to the streets across the country to protest economic mismanagement and al-Bashir's conduct of counterinsurgencies in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Security forces killed scores of protesters and the government blocked news coverage and instituted an internet shutdown, but the protests continued. The government, however, acceded by issuing payments to families and raising wages.⁹ Shortly thereafter, signs of dissatisfaction in the top ranks of government emerged as dissidents in the National Congress Party suggested reaching out to secularists and

leftists. Al-Bashir then pushed out his longtime ally Ali Osman Taha and shook up the cabinet. Within two years, he had again out-maneuvered rivals to win re-election outright (which may have been due to the boycott of a number of opposition parties and low voter turnout). Also in 2015, perhaps in a bid to obtain needed financial support from Gulf countries, the government sent a battalion of regular forces to join the Saudi-Emirati coalition fighting in Yemen, and shortly thereafter, a larger group of forces to support the UAE there.¹⁰ Street protests and stay-at-home protests — this time over price hikes on consumer goods — continued in late 2016.

Popular Revolution Brings al-Bashir’s Downfall

Despite the Trump Administration’s decision to remove US sanctions that President Obama had begun to ease in 2017, the impact wouldn’t be felt for some time.¹¹ While the Sudanese government was being kept afloat by cash injections from Gulf countries, the reduced revenue from low oil prices and heavy costs from its security operations throughout the country drove the government to eliminate subsidies on bread in early 2018.¹² Battered by years of austerity, people again protested. In December, protests erupted in Atbara at a rail center where Sudan’s first trade union and its communist movement originated in Nile River State in Sudan’s northeast. The protests spread throughout the country during the month; women comprised a high percentage of the protesters. The government responded with force, killing and injuring protesters. The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) joined the protests to help with organization and called for al-Bashir’s departure. The regime tried to divide the protesters through tactics such as having national intelligence (NISS) director Salah Ghosh allege that Darfuri students in Sennar were agents of the rebel Sudanese Liberation Movement. In Khartoum, al-Bashir unleashed the NISS, which killed and injured protesters. On January 1, a coalition of the SPA, civil society groups, and political parties then issued a Declaration of Freedom and Change calling for al-Bashir’s resignation, for the formation of a technocratic transitional government, for an end to human rights violations and internal conflicts, and for investigations into recent killings. Named the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), this coalition then spearheaded subsequent protests. The FFC and protesters used Facebook and other social media outlets to organize and to share information.¹³ Subsequent demonstrations over the next few weeks yielded similar brutal crackdowns. Al-Bashir resigned as head of the NCP and then appointed a new cabinet as a general strike hit. In early April, protesters staged a sit-in at the army headquarters in Khartoum, calling on the military to join them. Nonetheless, security forces attacked protesters in Khartoum and Omdurman. By mid-May, more than 90 people had been killed since the protests erupted in December.¹⁴

In mid-April, the military moved to oust al-Bashir and a transitional military council was formed. Even with this action, the protesters continued their sit-in, carrying forth what was believed to be “the largest, nonviolent mobilization in Sudan’s history.”¹⁵ This was cause for worry for the government as mass protests had led to the downfall of governments in 1964 and 1985, and had now brought al-Bashir’s departure.¹⁶ Despite changes at the head of the military council and ongoing negotiations between the military and protesters, the military refused the call for civilian rule while violence against protesters continued. On May 28-29, a two-day general strike brought businesses to a standstill. On the night of June 3, the last day of Ramadan, security forces attacked the sit-in and killed more than 100 protesters (with the government shutting down the internet, mobile devices provided crucial evidence for this event). Protesters remained undaunted and called for full civilian control; two days later, the African Union suspended Sudan and within two weeks, neighboring Ethiopia called for civilian-led joint rule. By the end of June, the Forces for Freedom and Change were back in the streets — however, government violence continued against protesters, leading to a break in talks.

On August 17, 2019, the military council and FFC signed a power-sharing agreement to form a Sovereign Council composed of six civilians and five generals. Currently chaired by Gen. Abd-al-Fatah al-Burhan, it will transition to civilian leadership in May 2021 until elections are held. Within two weeks, the civilian members named Abdalla Hamdok, a former UN official, as prime minister. The next month, a new 18-member government cabinet was formed, and in mid-October, the new transitional government began peace talks with rebel groups from the three main conflict areas — Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan. Despite the government's apparent new orientation, its lead government negotiator was Hemedti, the head of the Rapid Support Forces and an architect of the violence in Darfur.¹⁷ The agreement also called for a national independent investigation of the June 3rd events and massacre.¹⁸

Transition, Governance, and the Elusiveness of Justice

Several months into the 39-month transition, the political and security situation remains fluid. In February 2020, Sudan announced it would hand al-Bashir over to the ICC; this was seen as an effort to engage the international community.¹⁹ A month later, Prime Minister Hamdok survived an assassination attempt in Khartoum, perhaps a warning shot to reformers from ever-powerful security actors.²⁰ The revolution has brought a transition toward civilian rule, while the challenges of an entrenched security sector, longstanding regional conflicts, and economic deprivation — now exacerbated by COVID-19 — threaten to derail change. However, the popular turnout across the nation — from Nertiti to Port Sudan — for the commemoration of the June 3rd massacre and the June 30th mobilization have shown that Sudan's people will remain vigilant.

Information and Media in Transition

Sudan is a country in transition in many ways, most recently and profoundly in its governance. Access to information — from inside and outside the country — is a key factor. Sudan's media have been state-owned or state-aligned for decades, and press associations and councils are monitored by the state.²¹ The internet and social media have been the means for many Sudanese, especially younger generations, to get information as well as to share it with the world. While some 70% of the public has a mobile phone subscription, only 30% has had some access to the internet within the last three months.²² Like other constraints on access to technology for the country, this is likely due to international sanctions. Social media — accessed through virtual private networks (VPNs) to circumvent government-sanctioned internet shut-downs — has been an increasingly important tool for mobilizing public protest²³ (never more so than with the December Revolution).

Words or Phrases That Are Offensive and Inflammatory

The words and phrases that follow were identified by survey respondents as “offensive and inflammatory” and potentially inciting violence in Sudan. The terms’ severity, meaning, and context were further critiqued through validation activities in Sudan, as well as by the project’s Sudanese expert advisers. Based on these terms and their associated data, the project team then identified examples of such terms in online sample posts, which were selected to highlight the meaning and context of the terms. While not an exact ranking, this listing of words and phrases reflects the inputs of validation participants, expert advisers, and project staff as to their offensiveness and resonance to the current situation in the country.

PLEASE NOTE: The sample posts and quoted comments from online posts, as well as their translations, may contain offensive, inflammatory, or obscene language.


1. عبد / Abed, A'b / Slave, Nigger

Other spellings of Nigger: عبید / Abeed (plural) / Niggers; عب / A'b or Abed (singular) / Nigger, Slave

Other spellings of Black: حبة زرقاء / Habba Zarga / Blue Dot; أسود / Aswad (male) / Black; سودا / Sawda' (female) / Black; الزرق / Al Zoroq / The blue colored people (dark skinned); زرق / Zoroq / The blue colored people (dark skinned)

Related references: خادم / Khadim / Maid; اسود / Aswad / Black; السود / Alswood negrouse; الزرق / zoroq / Blue ones; حبة زرقاء / Habba Zarga / Blue spot, blue; عبید / Abeed / Negro; عب, زيدي / Aa'b (male); Oshi (Osh'a, Oshari); امباي / Ambeyi; بايا / Ambeya; ملامح وجهك غير جميله / Your facial features are not beautiful because you are a negro woman / Malamih Waghik geer jameela laanik khadim; انتي سودا ماحتعريسي / You are black, you will not get married / Enti sawda ma hatarisii

Sample posts:



The screenshot shows a tweet from a user with a greyed-out profile picture. The text of the tweet is in Arabic: "يخواننا لا العنصرية ما حاجة كويسة!!! ما اي زول عب تقولو ليهو فار..". Below the text is a "Translate Tweet" button. The tweet includes two images: on the left, a close-up of a brown rat eating a piece of cheese; on the right, a person's face is obscured by a grey box, with only their hands and part of their clothing visible. The tweet is dated "Mar 31" and has "1 Retweet" and "3 Likes".

Translation: “Yo, racism is bad. Don’t be calling any nigger a rat.”



Definition: This term is used by Northern Sudanese or Riverine Sudanese to refer to Sudanese who are dark-skinned. It is used to convey the speaker’s view that the dark-skinned person is non-Arab and of African origins, and thus not a true Sudanese who is thought to be an Arab Muslim. As some dark-skinned Sudanese tribes were held as slaves by Arabized Sudanese, it can also convey inferiority or second-class status upon the targeted person. “Negro” is a similar term to refer to a black man or woman, while the phrase, “You are black, you will not get married,” is used to convey that black women are undesirable for marriage and family because of their appearance (in this line of thinking, a dark-skinned person should marry a dark-skinned person while a non-black person should marry another non-black person). The term recalls times in Sudan’s history where certain Sudanese populations were enslaved — such as when Arabized Sudanese enslaved non-Arab Sudanese and more recently when non-Arab Sudanese were relegated to roles with lower social status. As a survey respondent noted, this is “a term that is frequently used fiercely among the sons of the north and the Nile center to describe the sons of black margins (i.e., Darfur and the Nuba Mountains) in Sudan.” Another respondent added, “The darker the skin, and the more prominent the stereotypical “African” (physical) features , the more a person is thought to be descended from former “slaves,” i.e., not of Arab descent, less worthy than the average Sudanese person.” It is also used to characterize behavior that is seen as uncivilized. It might be used to characterize people as aggressive by nature, for example, “People from Darfur are not originally part of Sudan,” or, “People from Darfur are fighting each other for years.” A related term, “Oshari,” refers to someone who was previously enslaved as it indicates that the person was brought from somewhere else to Sudan, and so is not fully Sudanese. In contemporary society, the term “Nigger” has also been used to refer to those younger, dark-skinned men who have adopted “gangster rapper” style as their own with the connotation that they are not only black but criminal.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The use of the term is intended to denigrate a person as inferior based on their darker skin color or ethnic origin. This occurs despite the fact there are Sudanese Arabs with skin as dark as non-Arabs. It implies the superiority of lighter-skinned people and that the darker-skinned person is of a lower class, is less civilized, is not a citizen or not worthy of the rights of a citizen, and is perhaps even criminal. As one respondent put it, the term “Differentiates between people based on delusions of racial superiority and historical bitterness.” The term recalls historic, unequal relationships such as slave relationships in Sudan’s history. It is highly inflammatory; as another respondent noted, “it exacerbates the tribal and ethnic conflict between the social components and dismantles the intertwined and peaceful coexistence between the tribes of the same region.”

Alternative word(s) that could be used: أفارقة / Affariqa / African; مواطني الغرب / Muwatni Algharb / people from the western region; جبال النوبة / Jebal Al Nuba / Nuba Mountains; سودانيين / Sudanyyen / Sudanese; he/she

2. جنوبي / Janobi / Southerner

Other spellings or related references: جنوبية / Janobiyah / Female from the south; زي الجنوبيين / Zai al-Janobyen / Like the southerners

Sample posts:



The image shows two sample tweets from a social media platform. Each tweet is displayed in a light gray box with a white background. To the right of each tweet is a white box containing its English translation. The first tweet is a reply, dated Feb 21, 2020, at 5:08 PM, from 'Twitter for Android'. The text of the tweet is 'ياخ شوف ليك جنوبي يغسلها ليك بدل الجرجرة دي' and its translation is 'Translation: "Why don't you find a southerner to wash it for you instead of all of this fussing."' The second tweet is also a reply, dated May 3, 2019, at 3:01 AM, from 'Twitter Web App'. The text of the tweet is 'ياهو حالهم. في انتخابات 2010 مرشحهم كان جنوبي 😊 عاد يا الشعبي عاملين شذاذ آفاق' and its translation is 'Translation: "This is their situation. In the 2010 elections their candidate was a southerner with open mouth and cold sweat. Oh, the people have returned, working as a splendid prospect."' Both tweets have a 'Translate Tweet' link below the text.

Definition: The term's origins are in the Arabic word for southerner. Over Sudan's long history, people in the south were treated as second-class citizens by people of northern Sudan (who were primarily ethnic Arabized elites). The term is used as a slur against someone who has dark skin. It attempts to convey the inferiority of the southerner based on his/her origins and the belief they are of a lower social class. This is reinforced by a history of abductions and enslavement of southerners by northern Sudanese during the civil war that was justified on the basis of an ideology that defined Sudanese as Arab and Muslim.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The term evokes the historic negative treatment of southerners by northerners while also conveying that southerners are inferior based on their origins and physical appearance. It applies attributes to a whole region of people denying their individual humanity, and is an incitement to discrimination.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: South Sudanese / جنوب سوداني / Janoob Sudani

3. غرابي / Gharraba / Westerner

Other spellings: غرابية / Gharraba (Plural) / Westerner; غرابوي / Gharrabi (singular masculine); غرابية / Gharrabiya; غرابي / Gharrabi; عنقرة العب / Anqarat Al Abd / Stool of the slave / nigger

Related references:

دآر فُوري / فوراي / Darfuri, Forawi / Person from Darfur; ناس دارفور ناس مشاكل / Nas Darfur nas mashakil / People from Darfur are problematic; ناس دارفور ناس مشاكل / Nas Darfur nas mashakil / People from Darfur are problematic; الزول دة غرابوي شيين / Al zey da Gharrabi shayn / This person is an ugly Westerner

Sample posts:



الغرابه ديل بس الله يشيلهم من الوجود، وبالذات حرس جامعتنا 🙄🙄🙄❤️.

[Translate Tweet](#)

6:18 · 28 Sep 16 · Twitter for Android

Translation: “I hope God erases those Gharraba from existence, especially those security guards at our university.”



جيد جدا انا لم اقل شيئا
عشان ما يجي زول يقول لي كرهتينا بي ناس دارفور

[Translate Tweet](#)

· Jun 12, 2019

انا ياداب عرفت انو شهداء مجزرة دلج ١٦٠ شهيد وشهيدة 🙄🙄🙄❤️
رينا يرحمهم ويحسن اليهم
بس ياخي انا مضايقة وقلبي واجعني عليهم،، ليه صورهم ما ماليا السوشل ميديا مش هم
سودانيين زينا زيهم مش ثورتنا دي قامت عشان السودان دا يسعنا كلنا؟! 🇸🇩🇸🇩🇸🇩🇸🇩
#مجزرة_الدليج
#العصيان_المدني_الشامل

2:21 AM · Jun 12, 2019 · Twitter for Android

Translation: “Very good that I didn’t say anything so that no one comes and says you’ve driven us crazy with people from Darfur.”

Definition: The term refers to someone with black skin from western Sudan’s Kordofan or Darfur regions, as well as the Nuba Mountains. The speaker intends to convey that the person is inferior based on their skin color and physical appearance, but also because the region is conflict-prone and less developed — since the person is black and from the West, all of his qualities are seen as negative. “Zorg” literally means blue/black and is used against dark-skinned people. Rich people in Khartoum are most likely to use the term although they rarely say it directly to the targeted person. While the term may have been present before 2003, it gained prominence during the conflict in Darfur. It has become common in part because of the number of Westerners who have relocated to Khartoum and other cities to find work.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The speaker uses the term to assert their superiority on the basis of the Westerner being darker skinned and from a less-developed and troubled region. It is used to suggest that the person from the West lacks understanding or is unsophisticated, and that they are hateful and have a “black heart.” The use of the term also recalls the enslavement of darker-skinned people by lighter-skinned people in Sudan’s history. In addition, it implies that the person with darker skin is from another part of Africa, (e.g., “West African” or “Abyssinian”) and is not a true Sudanese. It is therefore highly inciteful, creating division and hostility and fueling conflict. The term expresses the discrimination that dark-skinned Westerners experience in employment, as well as the origins of the conflict in Darfur.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: ابن إقليم الغرب / Abnaa agaleem al Gharb / son of the western region; كردفان / people of Darfur / Kordofan; ناس دارفو / Nas Darfur/ Kurdofoan; مواطن سوداني / Muwatin Sudani / Sudanese citizen

4. خادم / Khadim / Maid (female)

Other spellings: : الخدم / Al Khadim / The maid; يا خادم / Ya khadim / You maid

Related references: أسود / Aswad / Black

Sample posts:



The image shows two screenshots of tweets. The first tweet, dated Oct 22, 2018, contains Arabic text: "متخلفه انتي لمن مشيتي للوهميات الزيك ديك وقولتي هي ما لا سككت سككتا عشان م ممكن انبيح مع الكلبات الزيك وزيبها وجايبه تعملي لي فيها ناصحه انصحني نفسك وخليك مني ي الرهييه حركات خدم". The English translation provided is: "You retard when you went to those delusional girls like you, asking why did she keep quiet. I kept quiet because I can not bark with dogs like you and them. And you come here trying to advise me, advise yourself and leave me and this maid behaviour." The second tweet, dated Feb 25, 2020, contains the Arabic text: "انتني لاقية يا خادم؟". The English translation provided is: "Can you even find, you maid?"

Definition: The term is derived from the word for a female servant in a home. However, it is used to refer to people from western Sudan, Nuba Mountains, or Blue Nile in order to characterize them as slaves and distinguish them as non-Arab and lower in social status. Since most women from these areas are dark-skinned and come from marginalized groups, the term is discriminatory on the basis of race, class, and gender. It conveys the belief that the person is simple, uneducated, or ignorant. It is used to serve the social structure of superiority and inferiority; historically, people from ethnic African tribes were slaves to people from ethnic Arab tribes, and

these perspectives and unequal relationships persist in terms of opportunity and resources. In more recent times, the term found use in Kordofan to refer to people from the Nuba Mountains who were displaced by warfare and worked as servants for locals.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: As one respondent pointed out, the term classifies society into simple master and slave roles based on skin color and ethnicity. It is dehumanizing and places the targeted person in an inferior role. It also conveys contempt for women based on their skin color (as an example, “Can you believe this servant does not want to marry me?”).

Alternative word(s) that could be used: مواطن / Muwatin / citizen; انسان / Zol / Shakhs / Insaan / person

5. جنقاوي / Jangaoui / Seasonal laborer

Other spellings or related references: jungo; جنقة / Jange; jangawi; جنقاي / Gungai; جنقاجورة / Janjagura; جنقو / Jango

Sample posts:




عندي جدي كان لمن يمشي السوق بمسك اقرب جنقاوي بخلي
يشيل ليو الاكياس و يوصلهم البيت ويقول لي اتخرج

Translate Tweet

9:43 PM · May 23, 2020 · Twitter for Android

Translation: “I have my grandfather when he used to go to the market, he would grab the closest jangaoui and make him carry his plastic bags and when he would get home, he would tell him to get lost.”



مشكلة البلد دي انو الناس بتحشر روحها في البخصها و الما
بخصها ؛ و دا المخلي البلد دي راجعة لي ورا ؛؛ يجيبو وزير
مالية ما عندو علاقة بي الاقتصاد يجيبو وزير صحة جنقاوي
ساي..
يا ريت يعني لو اي زول احترام الحاجة البعرفها و جودها بدل
الهيطرش الحاصل في بلدنا دا

Translate Tweet

9:27 · 23 Sep 18 · Twitter for Android

Translation: “The problem of this country is that everyone is putting themselves out of their places, and this is what makes us go backward; they brought us a minister of economy who isn’t related to the economy and some jangawi minister for the ministry of health. I wish if everyone respected the thing that they know instead of this foolery happening in our country.”

Definition: The terms, used mostly offline, are related but not identical. While “jango” describes agricultural or seasonal laborers, “Jange” and “jangawi” target southern Sudanese laborers specifically as racial slurs. “Jungo” is used to refer to laborers from Darfur who occupy a slightly higher status than southerners. It is used by “jallaba” (rich people) in Khartoum as well as in North Kordofan, but is not widespread in Sudan. “Gungai” is a similar term used by Arab tribes in Darfur against non-Arab tribes. “Janjagura” is another term for seasonal or temporary workers that is used in Darfur to refer to people from South Sudan, while in Khartoum it refers to people from Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: It is a term used to denigrate low-skilled workers as inferior, and in the case of “jange” and “jangawi,” to denigrate southerners as inferior because of their race compared to Arab tribesmen in better occupations. It is a humiliation and an insult.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: اهالنا الطيبين / Ahalna Altaybeen / Our good relatives; العمال / Al Aamil / workers

6. الزغاوة عداوة / Zaghawa adawa / People from Zaghawa tribe are hostile

Other spellings: None provided

Related references: رطاني / Rattani / Speaker of a tribal dialect; زوغو / Zogho / Alternative for person from Zaghawa tribe

Sample posts:

The image shows two screenshots of tweets. The first tweet, from Feb 11, 2019, contains the Arabic text: "انت زاتك فاقد التربية ي جاهل بعد كده حربنا معاك ي حيوان .زغاوي. com". The translation provided is: "You also have no upbringing, ignorant. After this our war is with you, you animal. Zaghawi.com." The second tweet, from May 18, 2018, contains the Arabic text: "بدون عنصرية الزغاوة أرقبي أنواع العبيد". The translation provided is: "Without racism intended, Zaghawa are the most sophisticated slaves."

Definition: The origins of this term are not precisely clear, but it is believed to have emerged during the conflict in Darfur between Arab tribesmen and Zaghawa tribesmen who were known for their ferocity. It is thought that the al-Bashir regime subsequently spread this phrase in order to isolate the Zaghawa from other tribes as punishment for their role in the war, which then led to increased tensions between the tribes.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The phrase denigrates the Zaghawa as violent outsiders who are not fully Sudanese and stigmatizes the tribe as conniving, violent thieves. It dehumanizes Zaghawa members by ascribing false group characteristics to individual members. It may lead to increased tensions and conflict among tribes as it may make others feel threatened or intimidated by the Zaghawa.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: None provided

7. حداحيد / Hadaheed / Hadaheed

Other spellings or related references:

حدادي / hadadi; حداحيد / Hadaheed / Slave; ماي / Mai (in Zaghawa language) / Zaghawa are hostile; الزغاوة عداوة / Zaghawa Adawa / People from Zaghawa tribe are hostile; البياتة / Albayatii / Homebodies

Sample post:



· Mar 11, 2019

هؤلاء الرجرجه والدهماء الذين يقتاتون ويسترزقون من بقايا موائد السلطان النتنه لايمثلون دارفور ابدا وليس لهم الحق يتحدثون باسم النضال انتم عار علي دارفور ماكل خمسه فروخ حرام ولا حداحيد يحملو سلاح يتحدثون باسم شعب دارفور مثل ابو قرده وجمعه ارو ودبجو فلان وفرتكنا تمشو بس بلانضال

Translation: “These chagrins and demagogues who feed on and reap from the remnants of the Sultan’s stinking tables do not represent Darfur at all, and they have no right to speak in the name of the struggle. You are a disgrace to Darfur. Not every five bastards and Hadaheed who carry weapons can speak in the name of the people of Darfur, such as Abu Garda, Jumah Aru, Dabajo, So-and-so can walk towards the struggle.”

Definition: The term has various meanings since it is used in different ways depending on the area of the country. It can refer to a laborer in a forge or ironworks, or someone engaged in pottery, but it is used by urban elites or upper class to target someone as lower class. It was common in West Kordofan and in North Kordofan equivalent terms are “machouh” or “kisha.” In addition, it may be used by some Zaghawa specifically to refer to the Hadaheed tribe to label them as inferior, cowardly, and shameful. Indeed, in Darfur, they are seen as untouchables and people avoid mingling or eating with them. Thus, the name of the tribe has been turned into an epithet. This mostly takes place in offline settings in rural areas.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: It is meant to label someone as inferior, unclean, and uncivilized. It causes the targeted person to feel humiliation and inspires anger and a likely confrontation. It stereotypes an individual as having the perceived negative attributes of a group of people. The use of the term increases the isolation of Hadaheed people and overall tensions between tribes.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: None provided

8. جنجويد / Janjaweed / Mounted Gunman

Other spellings or related references: janjawid; جينجا / Janja

Sample posts:



Apr 8

الدعم السريع في بيان حول حادثة اعتداء احد أفرادها على طبيب في الضعين:

- تم وضع الضابط المذكور بالإيقاف حتى تكتمل الإجراءات القانونية اللازمة.
- تؤكد قوات الدعم السريع أنها دائماً مع القانون وأن مثل هذه المواقف يتم البت فيها بحسم ودون تهاون وبالله التوفيق والهداية .

#السودان



28 8 53

Replying to

جنجويد رباطه

Translate Tweet

2:28 PM · Apr 8, 2020 · Twitter for Android

Translation: “The Rapid Support Forces in a statement about the assault of a doctor by one of its officers in Ed Daein:

The officer in question has been placed on leave until the necessary legal procedures are taken

The Rapid Support Forces assures that it always abides by the law and that incidents like this are handled decisively without compromise. May God grant success and guidance.”

Translation of reply tweet: “Ruthless Janjaweed.”



دليل جنجويد ودا حرامي حمير .

Translate Tweet

4:08 AM · Apr 3, 2020 · Twitter for iPhone

2 Likes

Translation: “They are Janjaweed and he is a donkey thief.”

Definition: The term originated in Darfur as a term to describe young hooligans. However, it became known worldwide as the name of a militia drawn from Arab tribes in the western regions and organized and supported by Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). They have been used as proxy forces to suppress local rebel groups in Darfur, and are known for their brutality, including killings, criminality, and looting. More recently, the term has been used by revolutionaries to refer to the perpetrators of the June 3, 2019, massacre and to seek justice for that crime. The perpetrators are believed to be the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces who are composed of "janjaweed" Arab militias.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: While the term has a historical basis, it has been applied to characterize Arab tribespeople in the west as a group. In this case, it has the meaning of thug, criminal, and lawless. It perpetuates the stereotype that all Arab tribespeople are violent or support violent militias. Labeling a person or tribe on the basis of an element of those tribes is discriminatory and dehumanizing.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: قوات غير نظامية / Gouat ger nithamiya / irregular forces; ميليشيات / Malishyat / militia

9. شمالي / Chemali / Northerner

Other spellings: النخب النيلية / Ankhbab al Nilen / Elites of the two Niles; شايقي / From Shayguiya tribe / Shaggy; دنقلاوي / Dongolawii / From Dongola tribe; عربي / Arabii / Arab; عرب الشمالية / Al Shamaliya Arabs / Aarab al shamaliya

Related references: النخب الشمالية / Nile Elites; شمالي1, الشماليين2 / People from the northern region (1. Singular, 2. Plural); قبائل الشايقية / Shayguiya tribe; الدناقلة / Dongola people; عربي / Erabe; bringer; حلفاويين2, حلفاوي1 / from Halfa tribe (1.Singular, 2. Plural); جلابي / jallaba; نجيس / Nageed / Shrewd; محتال / Mohtal / Con artist; انتهازي / Intihazi / Opportunist

Sample posts:

Retweeted

RT
مع احترامي ليكم لكن ثورتكم دي ثورة جلابيه
وناس حلويين بس: (بتتصورو باشكال وف حتات لو سقطت م اظن الشينين
الزي دي يخشوها ع...

Translate Tweet

3:18 PM · Mar 9, 2019 · Twitter for iPhone

Translation: "RT @[name redacted]: With all due respect to you people but your revolution is a revolution of Jallaba and good-looking people only: (You take pictures in different styles and in different places that if the regime fell I don't think ugly ones like this one would enter them..."

RT
ي كادح ي بليد وقف قلبك ده عن العمل لحدي م تبقا جلابي وامورك توضح

Translate Tweet

12:48 PM · Mar 1, 2020 · Twitter for Android

Translation: "You stupid labourer, stop your heart and keep working until you become a Jallabi and your situation improves."

Definition: It is a term that refers to elites from northern Sudan who have dominated Sudanese government, politics, and business since independence. It initially targeted wealthy northern traders or upper-class people who would travel from the north to the regions for trade but it also refers to the Sudanese intelligentsia or elites. It emerged to describe those northerners who cheated, who were corrupt or exploitative, or who otherwise had questionable character. While it might be considered hate speech, it is used against northerners who are seen as perpetrators of hate speech and who use ethnicity to propagate their rule. Another version of this term, “Arabe,” is a bit different in that it refers to an unsophisticated person from the north or east. “Jallaba” is a term to describe wealthy traders of the north who used to bring goods for trade to the other parts of the country.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: This term defames northerners as con artists and mercenaries, but is unlikely to incite violence. This is in part due to the fact that northerners are in positions of power (relative to “gharraba” or “jange” who are in a more vulnerable status) and thus are able to be indifferent to the slur. However, if the context of its use is political in nature (such as affiliation with the NCP) the term might lead to conflict given the historical inequalities between the north and the regions as well as injustices perpetrated by the northerners on the different peoples of Sudan.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: ابن البلد / Ibn Albalad / son of the country; سوداني / Sudani / Sudanese

10. جلابة / Jallaba / Privileged or wealthy

Other spellings or related references: شمالي / Shamali / Northerner (Singular masculine)

Sample post:



The image shows a screenshot of a tweet from a user whose profile picture is blurred. The tweet text in Arabic reads: "السودان عبارة عن سماسرة أولاد حرام و جلابة نصهم كيزان و تجار عشقهم الجشع والتخزين والتهريب ماسكين البلد بطلعوها و بنزلوها بمزاجهم لعنة الله عليهم أجمعين. 😊". Below the text is a "Translate Tweet" button and a timestamp: "10:12 AM · Aug 18, 2020 · Twitter for iPhone". To the right of the tweet is a text box containing the English translation: "Translation: 'Sudan is just a bunch of bastard brokers and Jallaba, half of whom are Kezan and merchants whose love is greed, storage and smuggling, holding the country up and inflicting it with their mood, may God curse them all.'"

Definition: The term is derived from the Arabic term “jab” meaning “brought.” It refers to those people (mostly from northern regions) who brought trade and goods from different regions and countries to Sudan’s outer regions through the use of commercial caravans. They also bought local products to sell in the northern regions. It was used to describe the most greedy and opportunistic Arab traders among them who exploited the local population. Because of this history of exploitation, many western Sudanese consider such traders as inherently expatriates and as not belonging to the social composition of the western regions. The term also has a connection to slavery: these “jellaba” often had a large number of slaves accompanying them on their trips and may have sold and bought slaves.


More recently, the term is used to refer to upper class or wealthy people from northern Sudan — particularly those with influence who could make the government act on their behalf (for example, getting authorities to act to remove people from their land in the Nuba mountains so that the “jallaba” might exploit it). It is used more recently to describe rich and wealthy people (for example, those who are living in a wealthy enclave or have a nice car) and to refer to northern Sudanese who tend to have more access to such resources in Sudan.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The term is more descriptive than inflammatory, but nonetheless denigrates wealthy northerners by characterizing them as corrupt or having ill-gotten wealth as a group.

11. قحاة / Kahhata / People from the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC)

Other spellings or related references: شيوعي / Sheouyi / Communist (Singular masculine); القحاة تحت الباتة / Kahhata tihit al bata / Kahhata are under the boots; قطيع قحت / herd of Kahhata / Gatia kahhat; قحت / Kahhat/ Acronym for FFC in Arabic

Sample posts:



امرقوا كفاكم
الشعب اباكم

قحاطه مانافعين
خانوا الوطن والدين

لاغاز لاوقود لاعيش
ياحمدوك اخير الجيش

ترجعوا بره كفانا مضره
ياخوانا ديل مرضونا
جيتونا ضد الدين
يا عصابة التمكين

قحاة كذابين
ضد القيم والدين

يا شيوعي يا جبان
شريعة بس وما في دس

Translate Tweet
10:18 PM · Mar 18, 2020 · Twitter for Android
3 Retweets 11 Likes

Replied to [Profile] · Mar 18


امرق برا امرق فوت
ياحمدوك عدمننا القوت

لا جيتوا سلام لا شغنا نظام
واله حرام نعيش في غلام

عاوزين رمضان من غير سكران
حمدوك جبان خان السودان

Translation: “Go out, enough of you
The people have refused you
Useless Kahhata
They betrayed the country and religion
No gas, no fuel, no bread
The military is better than you
Hamadok
Go back outside, we’re fed up with sickness
You’ve brought us against religion
You gang of enablers
Lying Kahhata
Against values and religion
You communist, you coward
Only Sharia and no hiding.”

Translation of reply Tweet:
“Go out, go out and leave
You Hamadok, we’ve lost our patience
You have not brought peace, nor have we seen order
I swear, it is forbidden that we live in this injustice
We want Ramadan without any drunk
Hamadok is a coward who betrayed Sudan.”



Definition: The term is believed to have been devised by representatives of the former regime or their allies who are against the current transitional government and the civil-military agreement that created it. It is used to discredit members of the opposition and specifically to stir up criticism and displeasure with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition and with the agenda of the coalition. The word may be derived from “Gahata” or “Kahata” (the Arabic pronunciation of the FFC, the opposition coalition that toppled al-Bashir). The actual Arabic word is قحت, but Bashir loyalists use قحط / Kaht” as a derogatory term to attack FFC supporters. While the former is a neutral word, the latter is a word loaded with negative connotations like drought, starvation, and famine, and is used to associate the political coalition with images of disaster. It is thought that the word may have emerged in response to the activities of the “Committee of Dismantling Operations” established to identify the corruption of regime loyalists in state institutions and state-owned companies. Coincidentally, some coalition activists have proudly referred to themselves with this term. Finally, قطيع قحت / herd is a related term used to denigrate supporters of the transitional government as livestock who follow their leaders without thinking for themselves.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The term is used on social media sites featuring discussions of political affairs. While the term may not yet be hate speech, it is contributing to a climate of polarization and escalating tensions by claiming that the revolutionaries will bring disaster to Sudan. Given Sudan’s history, this polarization could lead to targeting of enemies and civil strife.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: الحرية و التغيير / Alhuriya w altageer / Forces of Freedom and Change

12. تاجر دين / Tagir Deen / Traders of religion

Other spellings or related references: كوز / Koz / Omer al-Bashir supporter; ام بتاري / Um battari / Witch Doctor; فكي / Fakki / Witch Doctor

Sample posts:

Translation: “The extension of the series of failure is called... removing subsidies and begging the people... infinite donations of the sovereign council, didn’t I say you will ride a bus or transport if it’s not a show and these were just halftime adverts”

Translation of reply to Tweet: “You will be labeled a smashed Koz, be ready”

Translation of reply to Tweet: “Oh, I swear, this is a society that doesn’t understand... first they see that they are captured every year, once or twice, but they do not repent or remember... After this the saying should be fulfilled on them for real”

Translation of reply to Tweet: “They are seriously tricking them and the one who mentions them and tried to help them is either a smashed Koz, trader of religion etc.”

Translation: “More honourable and more dignified than any Koz is a thief that slaughters a trader of religion.”

Definition: This term is associated with the Inqaz (Salvation) regime which called upon members of the National Islamic Front and its supporters to join the government through its “tam-keen” (empowerment) initiative that was designed to replace careerist and potentially disloyal government officials and judicial authorities with those loyal to the Islamists’ agenda. However, this term reflects disillusionment with that initiative, as it refers to someone who manipulates or deceives others through the use of religious sentiments and affiliation in order to execute a political agenda, which many Sudanese found to be corrupt. The phrase conveys the belief that regime members traded upon religion and religious devotion in order to gain political power and support. Use of this term spiked after the December 2018 revolution that ousted the regime; it is used both offline and online and is frequently heard within mosques.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: For religious individuals with no political agenda, being labelled with this term is extremely offensive. It also targets large and prominent elements of society, such as religious leaders and the NCP and their allies, and labels them as being deceptive and corrupt even if they personally were not. While it may reflect widespread public sentiment, it is a term that increases polarization and tensions, potentially leading to conflict.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: مهووس / Mahwoos / obsessed

13. كوز / Koz / Omer al-Bashir supporter

Other spellings: كوز / Koz; كيزان / Kezan; أولاد الكيزان / Sons of Omer al-Bashir supporters / Awlad Keizan

Related references: Kezan; Kuz; Koaz; Keizan; Kizan; Kizan kids; ي كوز ندوسو دوس / we will step on any koz with our feet

Sample posts:



The image shows a screenshot of a Twitter post. On the left, there is a blurred profile picture and a name. Below it, it says "Replying to" followed by another blurred name. The main text of the tweet is in Arabic: "اي كوز ويينو نودسو دوس جيبو ما بنخاف ما بنخاف...ثوورة". Below the text are links for "Translate Tweet" and "7:17 AM · Apr 8, 2020 · Twitter for Android". On the right side of the screenshot, there is a text box containing an English translation: "Translation: 'Any Koz, where is he, we will smash him down, bring him, we don't fear, we don't fear, we don't fear...Revolution!'"

January 15, 2018 · 3

سنة عذا العالم والرغيف فيها بقروش الله انتقم من كل كوز
 بلا #ادعومعالي علي الكيزان

See Translation



3

Translation: “The world’s nutrition basket and in it bread is with money. May God take vengeance on every Koz. Come on #Praywithme against all the Kizan.”

Definition: The term is believed to have been originated by Hassan Al-Banaa, a founder of the Islamic brotherhood, who said in parliament, “Religion is an ocean and we are its ‘كيزانو / Kizan,’” meaning its vessels or carriers. The word “كوز / Koz” in Arabic is the name of a traditional metallic drinking cup in Sudan. During the 1980s and before the ascendance of the Islamists to power through the 1989 military coup, “Koz” was used to describe any person who was a member of the National Islamic Front. In current usage, “Koz” and its various iterations refers to a member of the former regime party, the National Congress Party (NCP), or those affiliated with it who participated directly in, or otherwise benefited from, their rule. However, the term is also a metaphor linked to certain traits like corruption, stealing, and abuse of authority. Being labelled as an “Omer al-Bashir supporter” is equivalent to being characterized as having these traits. It stems from hatred and resentment of the regime’s long rule (especially during the period of the Islamic Front, who were seen as against people’s liberation and against democracy). Examples of the term’s use include: “We will kill any Koz” or “We will smash any Koz.” It identifies the NCP and its leaders as Islamists. This phrase is a political usage referring to members of the former regime or to others affiliated with it. However, it is sometimes used to label those who go against popular public sentiment or who question the transition. “We will step on any koz with our feet” was a famous chant during the revolution that sparked debate as some nonviolent resistance activists saw it as inciting violence while other activists found it normal in comparison to the atrocities of the old regime.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: In the words of one survey respondent, this is “ideological hate speech” as it is driven by a notion to punish those NCP members who acted unjustly, corruptly, or criminally. As another noted, “This koz — we will knock him down/smash him” was a cheer of the revolution. However, it has also been used against people who criticized the performance of a transitional government minister, suggesting that critics are viewed as supporters of the prior regime. It targets members of the former regime with hatred as one survey respondent saw it, “stripping them of their humanity.” The frequency and intensity of this term may be due to the fact that the revolution has not been fully realized, but rather is in transition. Consequently, there is a real fear that the old regime may return. The term increases political tensions and polarization, and potentially furthers divisiveness in society. One slogan that has been heard is “Any Omer al-Bashir supporter, we will smash him!”


Alternative word(s) that could be used: عضو حزب المؤتمر الوطني / Aadou hizib al Motamaar al Watani / National Congress Party member; عضو الحركة الإسلامية / Aadou Al haraka Al Islamiya / member of Islamic Movement; حزب المؤتمر الوطني / Hizib al Motamaar al Watani / National Congress Party; جماعة الاخوان المسلمين / Jamea Alakhwan al Muslimeen / Muslim Brotherhood; أشخاص منتمون للحركة الإسلامية / Ashkhas momtameen lel haraka Al Islamiya / persons affiliated with the Islamic movement

14. شيوعي / Chouyoui / Communist

Other spellings: ياشيوعي / Ya sheyoue/ Shouoei / You communist

Related references: atheist; sheyoue; Shouoei; كافر / Kaffir / Infidel; ملحد / Mulhid / Atheist; علماني / Almani / Secular

Sample posts:




Translation: “RT @[Name Redacted]: Hang the last communist with the intestines of the last Koz.”

May 4

يكتفي فخرا انك مسلم
مش شيوعي ملحد لا ملة له 🤔🤔🤔

[See Translation](#)



3 Comments

Translation: *“Enough pride about being Muslim. Not an atheist communist without a religion.”*

Definition: “Communist” has been a term used to stigmatize someone who does not observe Muslim piety or someone who opposes the imposition of Sharia laws. Therefore, this person is seen by more conservative Muslims as an infidel. It is a term used to “denote unbelief or disbelief in God although it is a political term,” as a survey respondent observed. It was used opportunistically by former NCP members to refute non-regime ideologies as being against Islam and as merely materialistic. According to another survey respondent, the term was “introduced politically to besiege everyone who disagrees with the ruling authority and disapproves and accuses it.” Labelling someone a “communist” or an “atheist” in Sudan’s Muslim society is done to undermine the person’s credibility and to characterize them as an outcast and unqualified to comment on social matters. It has become more common since the December revolution as it is used to stereotype revolutionary actors who are described as not religious or religious enough and to smear them as against society and its norms. Example: “Nothing good can come from a communist.”

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The term itself is not necessarily an incitement to hatred, discrimination or violence, but it affects the political climate. However, because it places the targeted person as outside or hostile to Islam or as an apostate, it may carry a severe threat. More generally, it is used to limit people’s freedom of thought and expression by associating them with communism or atheism (which are largely rejected by a society under Islamic law and principles).

Alternative word(s) that could be used: علماني / Almani / secular; يساري / Yasarii / leftist

15. ملحد / Atheist / Molhid

Other spellings:: ما عندو دين / Ma indu deen / Has no religion; ياملحد / Ya mohid / you atheist

Related references: شيوعي / Sheyouei / Communist; علماني / Almani / Secular; كافر / Kaffir / Infidel

Sample posts:



Translation: “Just an Atheist Al Inqaz developed. You will get booted, God willingly.”



Translation: “What now you communist, infidel, after Coronavirus appeared do you now believe that God exists or not? You communist, you atheist.”

Definition: For Sudanese Muslims, if one is born Sudanese then one is born with the faith; therefore, to be an atheist, one must have renounced this faith. To Islamic extremists, this would be punishable by death. To some Sudanese Muslims, Christians and Buddhists are seen as atheists since they are not of the faith. The term is also used to challenge those who question religious institutions or beliefs and to label these people as unqualified since they're lacking in belief. More specifically, Islamic politicians have associated the term with “communist” and “secular” in order to scapegoat the opposition as being against religion or even as atheists. Indeed, a workshop participant noted the frequency of the term has increased since April 2019. It is also used to attack “anyone who speaks about rights and freedom,” as one survey respondent noted. Others noted that the term is used against those seen as trying to resolve intellectual or political goals in an opportunistic manner that has nothing to do with religion or belief.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: Given the predominance of Islam in Sudanese society, atheists are ostracized and fear for their safety from violence at the hands of extremists. Leveling this term against someone undermines their credibility in a society where Islam is foundational. Using this term has the effect of silencing the targeted person, preventing them from communicating their perspective even if it is valid and useful to society. To be seen as hostile to Islam is to be seen an outcast and at risk of being accused of apostasy and of therefore inviting death threats.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: علماني / Almaani / Secular

16. علماني / Almaani / Secular

Other spellings: علماني / Almaani

Related references: None provided

Sample posts:

The first screenshot shows a tweet from May 3, 2019, at 12:17 PM. The text in Arabic is: "ابعد ي شيطان ي منحط ي شيوعي ي علماني ي سافل تبا لك حيثما حللت". The translation box on the right reads: "Translation: 'Get out of here, demon, decadent communist, you low-life secularist. Curse you wherever you are.'"

The second screenshot shows a tweet from Nov 3, 2019, at 2:47 PM. The text in Arabic is: "كافر ملحد علماني". The translation box on the right reads: "Translation: 'Infidel, atheist, secular'".

Definition: Originally, this term was introduced by the al-Bashir regime's allies to attack those who criticized the regime's authority and who accused it of corruption and malfeasance. By associating the regime with Islam, the regime and its allies could condemn "secularists" not only for criticizing the regime but also for being antithetical to or outside of Islam. More recently, it is used by former regime members and their allies to discredit the transitional government.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: This term is used to associate the Forces for Freedom and Change or other critics of the former regime with those who are seen as attacking religion or exploiting faith norms in an opportunistic and disingenuous way. This, in turn, incites religious adherents to counter such people, potentially resulting in the death or torture of the "secularist."

Alternative word(s) that could be used: None provided

17. لوطي / Looti / Gay (male)

Other spellings: شاذ / Shaaz; خنيت / Khaneeth; حلوة / Hilwa; خول / Khoul; انباوي / Anbawi; باطل / Batil; خول / Khoul; خنيث / Khaneef; Khaneth

Related references: يا لوطي / Ya looti / You gay; اكلة / Aklaa / Meal; المثليين / Mithlieen / Homosexuals; خايب / Khayib / Homosexual; خول / Khawal; لوايطة / Louitaa / Gays; لوطي / Looti; معرص / Batil / Pimp; صقر / Dominant Gay / Eagle; شاز / Shaaz; نجاو / Nayaw / Gay / Bottom (sexual position)

Sample posts:



Retweeted

تخيل نموت بسبب لوطي زي دا RT


Translate Tweet

Replying to [redacted] Mar 27

2:05 25.6K views

2:12 PM · Mar 28, 2020 from [redacted] · Twitter for iPhone

Translation: “Imagine we die because of this kind of gay.”



June 6

العدنيا من ما جاتنا الترمطه والواطه كترت
انتا البخاريك منو يا هيماء كايرو البصاحب لوطي منو الا بيته لوطي زيو انتا راجل باخ اخجل باخ فضحتونا
والله انتا والوطي اب حفته
سجاد باخ انتو رجال ربنا الكرمك وخلقك راجل باخ كسم الرجله كان بقت كدي

See Translation

2 Shares

Translation: “Since the civilian rule, “prostitutionalism” and “gayism” has been growing.

Who is going to be friend with you Hima Cairo, who had a gay friend should be a gay himself, you are a man, you have to be ashamed of yourself, you disgrace us, you and your gay friend

[Name redacted] you are men, you have been created as a man, F*** manhood if it is this way.”

Definition: This is an offensive term referring to a homosexual male and implying that they are weak and immoral. It has a basis in the Qur’an story of Lot and the destruction Lot endured, and thus has a religious justification for its use. It has been used by sheikhs to mobilize against homosexuals. “Louti” and “Khawal” are similar terms with the meaning of sodomite. “Pimp” is another term used as a slur against a person suspected of being homosexual. The term is also used to label a heterosexual male and to characterize him as a coward, weak, or stingy. The term صقر / Dominant gay refers to men who seek out other men for sexual intercourse; this group may be less stigmatized than “submissive gays” as they are still exhibiting male superiority by their dominance over their partner.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The term is used to stigmatize sexuality and to discriminate against a person based on their sexual orientation in a society where Islamic law and principles forbid such an orientation. For the conservative Sudanese society, “Louti,” for example, is extremely demeaning and offensive. The terms dehumanize the group and increase their exclusion from society, potentially putting the targeted person at risk of violent attack from radical adherents of Islam. Moreover, the person who is targeted with such a slur may be provoked to attack in order to prove his masculinity or to defend himself. It is a rigid and intolerant term because it suggests that a person’s sexuality should be defined by society rather than by one’s self-identity. The term is also used to convey that an effeminate man (whether homosexual or heterosexual) is not a real Sudanese man. Fundamentally, its use promotes the notion that homosexuals do not have or do not deserve the same rights, dignity, and respect as others.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: مثلي / Methli / homosexual

18. ضكرية / Dakhariya / Lesbian

Other spellings and related references: None provided

Sample posts:

Replying to [Profile]

إذا كان مافي راجل في حياتها بتكون ضكرية
مسترجلة واصبحت الانوثة مفقوده عندها

Translate Tweet

7:30 AM · Dec 3, 2019 · Twitter for Android

Translation: “If there is no man in her life, then she will be a lesbian and a tomboy and her femininity became lost then.”

Replying to [Profile]

..☹️ WTF
اياك تطلع وما تكون لابس بوكسر يا حبيب حاول تتجنب اي مواقف
مواصلات فيها بنات كتار، ما تقعد وسط بنتين لانه حيمسوك، ولو
كتلوك ما تدي رقمك لاي بت ولا توصف ليها ساكن وين لانه ممكن
تتجازف عادي المشكلة ما هنا المشكلة دي شكلها ضكرية ويمكن
تحت تحت عندها تعشيقه ☹️

Translate Tweet

10:47 AM · Jun 20, 2020 · Twitter for Android

Translation: “WTF Make sure you never go out without your boxer shorts my dear, and try to avoid public transportation where there are too many girls, don’t sit between two girls or they’ll punch you in the face, and if she knocks you down don’t give them your number, and don’t tell her where are you living what you can easily overcome, the problem is that she is a tomboy and she can be holding a gear lever below :)”

Definition: “Dakhariya” is a slur used to attack lesbians. Since homosexuality is seen as going against the Islamic norms of Sudanese society (which holds to traditional binary male/female norms of sexuality), those who use the slur believe they are morally justified in their behavior. The term is used against women who are attracted to the same sex and specifically against those who

are perceived as less feminine. This term suggests that, in addition to the intolerance of different sexualities, there is a fixed notion amongst society as to what constitutes morally-sound femininity.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: As with the term “Gay,” these terms are used to stigmatize sexuality and to discriminate against a person based on their sexual orientation in a society where Islamic law and principles forbid such sexuality. The terms dehumanize the individual and group, increasing their exclusion from society and potentially putting the targeted person at risk of violent attack from radical adherents of Islam. The terms are intolerant because they suggest that a person’s sexuality should be defined by society rather than by the individual themselves. “Lesbian” is also used to discredit outspoken women.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: المثليات 2 / مثلية 1 – Female homosexual (2. singular) and Female homosexual (2.plural)

19. كنديان / Kindiana / Queer

Other spellings and related references: طاعم / Taaim / Tasty; كلجة / Kalaja/ Kalaga

Sample posts:

The image shows two screenshots of tweets. The first tweet is in Arabic and asks, 'عارف تصنيفك فيو شنو؟ جنا طاعم عارف الجنا الطاعم بسو فيو شنو الفيوان؟ ما داير تعرف' (Do you know what your classification is? A tasty child, do you know what they do to a tasty child? You don't want to know.). The second tweet is in English and says, 'no homo طاعم انتة طاعم' (No homo, because you are Queer.).

Definition: This is a slur that is used against transgender people. Another term, كلجة / طاعم / Kalaja (or Kalaga), refers to a transsexual woman who has had surgery to take on male genitalia. Since this expression of sexuality is seen as contrary to the Islamic norms of Sudanese society, those who use the slurs believe they are morally justified in their behavior.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: As with the slurs for “Gay” and “Lesbian,” these terms are used to stigmatize the sexuality of transgender people and to discriminate against people based on their sexual orientation in a society where Islamic law and principles forbid these expressions of sexuality. The terms dehumanize the individual or group and increase their exclusion from society, potentially putting the targeted person at risk of violent attack from radical adherents of Islam. The terms are intolerant because they suggest that a person’s sexuality should be defined by society rather than by the individual themselves.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: الكوير / Al Kaweer / queer; هويات جندرية لا معيارية / Hawaiyat genderiya la maeariya / non-normative identities

20. كافر / Kafir / Infidel

Other spellings: كافرة / Kufaar / Infidels

Related references: الكافر / Kafir / infidel; مرتد / Murtad / Renegade, Apostate; كفار صليبيين / Kofar Salybeen / Infidel Crusaders; شيوعي / Sheyouei / Communist; ملحد / Mulhid / Atheist

Sample posts:



Replied to

دماغ مسلم وطين كافر ولا شنو!!!
انعل ابوده حجاب

Translate Tweet

Translation: “Muslim brain and apostate ass!!!! Damned be this headscarf.”



February 13

لا فرق بين البشير و كافر حتى لو قال لا إله إلا الله لأنوا من قتلة نفسي واحدا متعمدا فهو في نار و البشير قتل 30 مليون نفسي عمدا

See Translation

24

23 Comments 1 Share

Translation: “There is no difference between Al-Bashir and an apostate even if he said the Islamic testimony, because whoever killed a person intentionally will end up in the same hell and al-Bashir killed 30 million of them intentionally.”

Definition: The term is used to indicate a non-Muslim or non-believer in Islam or someone who observes another faith. It implies that such a person is outside of society since Islam is the main belief in Sudan. “Apostate” is similar but conveys the meaning that the targeted person does not believe in God at all. The term has different implications depending on who is using it (such as a religious authority) and in what context (such as when a person questions mainstream religious interpretations or practices). However, respondents indicated that the term was co-opted by political authorities to use against those who disagreed with the former regime. One respondent noted a larger impact of the term:

“This term is the most common and inciting to hatred in Sudan because it is first used as a means to suppress freedom of thought and opinion and completely excludes the labeled person from the debate circle because they expressed their personal opinion regardless of the fact of their religious affiliation or not, and secondly because in religion and Islamic law specifically the description of the person (as) an infidel or apostate must be killed and his blood shed, and is considered a threat.”

Some respondents noted that radical Islamic groups use the similar term “heretic” to attack and kill those they believe are insufficiently devout. In their view, it is permissible to spill the blood of “apostates,” who lack the dignity of true believers. “Kafir” is also a term that is used to refer to an unbeliever, but since it is used against dark-skinned Sudanese, it also has racial overtones. The term was used opportunistically by both Islamic radicals and the al-Bashir regime to silence their critics.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The term separates believers from non-believers and so by definition it is highly divisive. The term is used to denigrate and declare the “non-believer” as an outcast in society, and to exclude and isolate them socially and politically. The term has been used to incite hatred against those seen as “non-believers” and under Islamic law this could have fatal implications. Since the term is measured on devotion to one’s faith, attacks on these non-believers can be seen as morally-justified.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: ماسوني / Masoni / Masons; مسيحي / Masihii / Christians; شيوعي / Sheyouei / communists; ماركسي / Marxii / Marxists; علماني / Almaani / secularists

21. شرموطة / Sharmoota / Whore

Other spellings: عاهرة / Aahraa / whore; شكشوكة / Shakshuka / whore; صعلوكة / Saaluga / whore or rude; شكش / Shaksh / word; ي شرموطة / Ya sharmoota / you whore; لبوة / Labwa / whore or lioness

Related references: شكش / Shakash / Whore; بت الحرام / Bit Haram / Daughter of sin; خالة / Khalaa / Aunty / Cougar; جقة / Gaghaa / Cougar

Sample posts:



Retweeted

هبيبيي يا شرموطة الزقاق يا ام كرعين الرقاق لمي : RT نفسك

Translate Tweet

2:26 PM · Jun 9, 2020 · Twitter for Android

Translation: “Hoppah you street whore with skinny legs, control yourself.”



Replying to

شرموطة لوطية ساي

Translate Tweet

8:33 AM · Feb 2, 2020 · Twitter for Android

1 Like

Translation: “A total lesbian whore.”

Definition: The term means prostitute in Arabic, and refers to someone who has sexual relations for pay, such as a sex worker. It is used to denigrate someone who is perceived as having characteristics of a prostitute: dishonest, lacking morals and self-respect, an adulterer, or otherwise of low social status. However, it is also used by religious conservatives or extremists against women who they believe behave inappropriately, particularly against women who are believed to have sexual relations outside of Islamic norms — such as a married woman who commits adultery or a divorced or widowed woman who has sexual relations (خالة / حقة). Religious conservatives might also use it against women who they believe wear clothing that is too tight or who do not wear a scarf, as well as against those who are outspoken with their opinions and beliefs. One respondent offered the example of “Look at the whore talking to us about freedom. Dress before you talk to us.” It may also be used against homosexuals and lesbians.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The term insults women (and in some cases homosexuals) by identifying them and their perspectives with sexual relations that are shamed by society. It aims to shame women into staying in traditional, subservient social roles, and insinuates that their perspectives are only valuable in the manner that men want to hear them. Given the strong religious, gender, and social implications, it can be psychologically harmful to women. In some cases, the woman who is slandered may be provoked to respond, or her male relatives may be provoked to respond in her defense.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: امرأة / Mar'a / woman; امرأة / Emra'a / female; سيدة / Saydah / lady

22. مرة مطلوقة / Mara matlouga / Loose woman

Other spellings: مطلوقات ساي / Say matlouga / Just a loose; للنسويات اشارة / Alnaswiyat isharaa / The feminist are a sign; مطلقه مره دي / Di mara matlouga / This is a loose woman; المطاليق الحريم / Hareem mataleeg / Loose women; صايعة / Saayaa / Delinquent; منحلات / Munhalat / lewd (plural); منحلة / Munhalaa / lewd (singular)

Related references: ما عندها والي / Has no guardian / Ma indaha walii; الفيمينست / Feminist / Alfeminist; بايرة / Single, unmarried woman / Bayraa; شرشوحة / Slut / Sharshuha; فاجرة / Fajrah / harlot, adulteress

Sample posts:



The image shows a screenshot of a tweet from a user with a blurred profile picture. The tweet text in Arabic is: "فخورين بيك ي مطلوقة لو بتي كان قمت عليك الحد قال مستقلة دي قلة ادب كيف تسكني براك من غير ولي مفروض يتبرو منك 😏". Below the text are options for "Translate Tweet" and "Twitter for Android". The timestamp is "12:40 AM · Dec 10, 2019". To the right of the tweet is a translation box with the following text: "Translation: 'They are proud of you loose woman, if you were my daughter you will be sentenced according to Islamic law, independent my ass, total mad disrespect, how can you live by your own without a male protector, they should repudiate you.'"



Definition: The phrase refers to a woman who is perceived to act outside the authority of family and a male guardian. According to a respondent, it refers to a woman who does “not fear neither her parents or her brothers” and acts contrary to the morals and rules for her behavior held by traditional Sudanese society. Specifically, it is used against divorced women or women viewed as having unconventional lifestyles. It is a slur, characterizing someone as a prostitute who has “no self-control” and who “has no respect for customs or tradition or propriety.” Originally, it might have mainly referred to a woman’s choices regarding her social or personal relations. More recently, it may be used to refer to a woman who is seen as liberated or educated, perhaps especially those taking a role in the revolution or transition. “Feminist” is a related term, which is meant in this usage to describe those who don’t follow custom or tradition with regard to dating or courting. Another related term, “cuckold,” compounds the intent to shame by suggesting the male partner of the woman is actually authorizing her activity (which undermines the notion of her independence).

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The phrase is an insult and is intended to shame liberal-minded women or others who don’t necessarily conform to the roles of traditional society. In doing so, it lowers the status and value of women before the public, and encourages conformity and submission among other women who fear suffering the same isolation and slander. It aims to suppress choices and opportunities for women, reducing their identity to gender stereotypes and leading to discrimination and violation of the woman’s human rights. Given that the targeted person is believed to violate social and religious norms in Sudan, use of this term can also incite violence against women. One workshop participant explained, “If you use this term to label a woman, and she tells her male guardian — father or brother — they will beat you up! She could even pursue a legal case for slander.”

Alternative word(s) that could be used: نسوية / Feminist / Nasawiya; امرأة مستقلة / Independent woman / Emra’a mustaghela

23. غلفاء / Ghalfa / Envelope, wrapped, covered (uncircumcised woman)

Other spellings: None provided

Related reference: ود غلفا / Wad ghalfa / Son of uncircumcised woman

Sample posts:

The image shows two screenshots of tweets. The first tweet, from August 5, 2018, from Sudan, says: "غلفاء وشايله موسها تطهر الله يكرمك" (Ghalfa and her son, may Allah purify her and reward you). The second tweet, from January 10, 2019, says: "لمن قلت ليك زما ان ف التويته ديك... انتي غلفا...م كنت كضاب عرفتني...غلفا فكريا وغلفا جسديا... حمانا الله... 🙌" (To those who told me you were a ghalfa... you were a ghalfa... I know... wrapped mentally and physically... may God protect us... 🙌).

Definition: The term refers to an uncircumcised woman and is primarily targeted at women who are thought to be uncircumcised, and is perhaps based on the belief that if a woman's genitals are not mutilated, she must have a higher libido and is therefore more likely to be promiscuous. However, it can also be used against someone who is considered "unclean" perhaps because they are "wad ghalfa," the son of an uncircumcised woman. The term is old and used mostly in rural, conservative areas of the country.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The term is used to denigrate and shame a woman. It is also a call to action for her to be circumcised, which is a violation of her dignity and identity based on others' religious and social views, as well as a painful and traumatic experience for a woman. The use of this term also encourages social acceptance of circumcision, as well as the norm that the family and its male leadership should control a woman's physical being, thus reducing a woman to inferior status.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: سليمة / Saleema / untainted

24. ود غلفا / Wad ghalfa / Son of an uncircumcised woman


Other spellings: None provided

Related references: ود الرزيلة / غلفاء / Wad Alrazeela / Envelope, wrapped, covered; ود الخمبة / Wad Al Khamsa / son of a loose, promiscuous woman; غلفاء / Ghalfa / Covered (uncircumcised woman)

Sample posts:

Dec 12, 2019
ما أطولك يا ليل... 🙄

ابكر ادم اسماعيل (مفكر الحركة الشعبية) بقول انه صراعهم مش مع الكيزان بس، بل مع كل الحاضنة الاجتماعية الاسلاموية التي تحكم منذ الاستقلال...



0:20 2.1K views

15 25 18

Replying to

العب ده عنصري جدا وحاقد
ده ود خادم غلفاء يا اخ تحلم يحكم السودان بطريقتك دي
تافه

[Translate Tweet](#)

12:05 PM · Dec 12, 2019 · Twitter for Android

Translation: “This nigger is racist and vengeful. He is the son of a wrapped servant, dreaming of ruling Sudan on his own way, what a petty.”



حميدتي.. غلفا وشايه موسها تطهر ..
#اعتصام_القيادة_العامه

[Translate Tweet](#)

4:04 PM · May 27, 2019 · Twitter for Android

Translation: “Hemedtii... is like an uncircumcised woman carrying her razor #sit-in massacre.”

Definition: This phrase is used to refer to a man as being the son of a woman who is believed to be uncircumcised and therefore considered unclean by traditional Muslims. While used against a man, it also indirectly targets women, especially those who are thought to be sexually active. The belief is that since the woman's genitals are not mutilated, she must have a higher libido, which raises the possibility that her son is the product of fornication or an illicit union. While social norms are changing (Sudan instituted a ban on female genital mutilation in 2020) this phrase is still prevalent in parts of Sudanese society. The phrase targets non-Muslims as well as people whose parents are unknown. It is often used by a man against another man to characterize him as cowardly, fearful, or weak.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: It dehumanizes the man by reducing his character and value to religious beliefs about a body part and sexuality. The phrase is also an insult to a man's mother since, among conservative Sudanese, it is completely unacceptable for a woman to not be circumcised and so it also reflects on his masculinity and identity. Given this social stigma, in addition to being offensive, use of the term also contributes to an environment where young women believe they should get circumcised or they will be stigmatized.


Alternative word(s) that could be used: None provided

25. فيهو عرق, عرق, فيه عرق, فيها عرق, فيهو عرق, زولة فيها عرق, فيهم عرق. عرق. / Fiho irigg / Has a race

Other spellings: عرق / irig/ Race; فيه عرق / Fiya irig / Has a race (first person); فيها عرق / Fiha irig / Has a race (feminine); فيهو عرق / Fiho irig/ Has a race (masculine); زولة فيها عرق / Zola fiha irig / A female person who has a race; فيهم عرق / Fihum Irig / Has a race (plural)

Related references: ما نضيف / Ma nadif / Unclean; الدم بنشم / Al Dam Bitsham / Blood can be smelt

Sample posts:



Ya'll act like you're against racism but won't give your daughters to a good man cause "فيهو عرق"

Miss me with that contradiction 😂

9:58 PM · Jan 24, 2016 · Twitter for iPhone

Translation: "He has a race."



Definition: The exact origins of this term are not known. The term is a racial slur used to demean dark-skinned persons or multi-ethnic individuals by referring to their ancestors' origins as slaves or in comparison to slaves. It is based on a person's appearance, especially their skin color, but also their hair and facial features. This term often surfaces in reference to the arrangement of marriages and social relationships. An "Arab tribe" may not accept interracial marriage with anyone of non-Arab ancestry. "فيهو عرق / Fihoo Irigg" means that the father and mother of a person are from different tribes. Thus, this bi-racial individual is considered impure or second-tier among their own tribe. For example, the saying "الدم بنشم / Blood can be smelt" is used to call into question a person's membership and lineage in a particular tribe since the tribal members claim they would know whether this person is one of their members. The phrase is also used to describe anyone who is not fully Arab or from an Arab tribe.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The term is highly inflammatory and is widespread on social media, in society, and even in the schools. The person using the term is making judgments based on physical appearance. It stereotypes a person with the negative characteristics believed by one tribe about another tribe and suggests that someone is inferior based on their differences or their mixed blood and tribal lines. It is highly emotive because it slanders the person as well as their heritage and ancestry.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: None provided

26. **ود / بت الحرام / Wad Al-Haram or Bit Al-Haram/ Son or daughter of sin (bastard)**

Other spellings: اولاد ورتة / Awlad waritha / Sons of inheritance; **ود الحرام** / Wad haram / Son of sin; **بت الحرام** / Bit haram / Daughter of sin; **ولد حرام** / Awlad haram / Sons of sin; **خلف لله** / Khalaf Allah / God's backwardness

Sample posts:

Replied to [redacted]

انت ود حرام ولا خول؟

Translate Tweet

8:09 AM · Apr 3, 2020 · Twitter for Android

Translation: “Are you born out of wedlock or a gay?”

Replied to [redacted]

بت الحرام دي قولتي ليها م تجيبني لي السمعه 🤔🤔

Translate Tweet

9:25 PM · Jun 19, 2020 · Twitter for Android

Translation: “Ask this daughter of sin to not ruin my reputation.”

Definition: The phrase refers to a child that is born outside of marriage or where the parents are unknown. It can also refer to a black child born of an Arab mother. In a traditional Muslim society, such a child is viewed with contempt and shame since such sexual relations are forbidden under Islamic norms. Since the person was born outside of society's norms and rules, the children are seen by traditionalists as without shame or morals. It is believed that since the person originated from a sinful act, the person will forever live a sinful life.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: The phrase is highly stigmatizing and aims to exclude the person from society. It portrays the person as unwanted and undesirable, an outcast perhaps without legal rights. As such, they are vulnerable and marginalized. It may provoke violence since the shame is cast not only on the person targeted, but on their parents as well.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: يتيم / Yateem / orphan

27. حبشي / Habashi / Ethiopian or Eritrean

Other spellings: حبشي / Ethiopian / Habashi; اريتري / Eritrean / Eritree

Related references: Habash; habesha; habash rubash; Habashiya; دموك / Dumook / Stupid; هندي / Hindii / Indian

Sample posts:

Aug 18

جدي لوالدتي عبدالحييب محمد أحمد بن الأمير ناجي بن علي بن ناجي الأول آل بن بريك الناخبي الياقعي في صورة عمرها سبعين سنة رحمه الله ورحم والديكم جميعا أغرد بها اليوم في الذكرى الأربعين لوفاته



811 559 2.3K

Translation of main tweet: “My grandfather to my mother, Abd al-Habib Muhammad Ahmad bin al-Amir Naji bin Ali bin Naji al-Awwal, Al bin Brik al-Yafa’i, the voter, in a seventy-year-old picture, may God have mercy on him and have mercy on your parents all tweet it today on the fortieth anniversary of his death.”

Replying to

من فين ندعت الصورة .. انك مسخرة .. انت اصلك حبشي و غصب تحاول ترضي اسياذك انك من شبه الجزيرة العربية

[Translate Tweet](#)

8:58 PM · Aug 19, 2020 · Twitter Web App

Translation of reply tweet: “From where did you get the picture? You are a mockery...You are of Habashian origin and of usurpation, trying to satisfy your masters that you are from the Arabian Peninsula.”

Replying to

Haha 😂 Habashi if the west didn't help you with donations and China and arabs didn't buy your country you'd be working in Sudan

12:26 AM · Mar 9, 2020 · Twitter for iPhone

Definition: This term refers to people like the Al-Banni Aamir tribe in Sudan who have origins in Eritrea. However, it is more generally used to target people of Ethiopian, Eritrean, or even Indian origins whose first language is not Arabic and who may be immigrants, seasonal workers, or who are otherwise non-citizens. It targets the person as a foreigner despite the understanding “that all societies in Sudan have a geographical overlap with all neighboring countries,” as one survey respondent observed. The term is common in Eastern Sudan and some neighborhoods in Khartoum and is used to convey the belief that this group only has low-income jobs and is of lower class; it also conveys the view that the person is of lower social status since they are likely Orthodox Christian in a Muslim society. “Habash rubash” means Ethiopian rubbish which equates Ethiopians with trash to be thrown out.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: It denies the basic human rights of these minorities, increases intolerance and xenophobia, and is used to promote national and ethnic superiority of the Arab Sudanese. It is used to assert that this group is backwards and uncivilized and not fully Sudanese. It is also used as a xenophobic term; for example, “You Eritrean this is not your country, go back to your country,” as a survey respondent explained.


Alternative word(s) that could be used: من الحبشة / Min Alhabasha / Ethiopian; ارتريين / Eritrean / Eritrean

28. اجنبي / Ajnabi / Foreigner


Other spellings: None provided

Related references: تشادي / Chadian / Tashadii; انت ما سوداني / Inta ma Sudani / You are not Sudanese; ما سوداني / Ma Sudani / Non-Sudanese; جنجويد / Janjaweed; الوافدين / Wafadeen; فاجغ / Fagagh / newcomers; نكرة / riffraff; وافدين / Drifters; غرابة، جلابة، فلاته / F.J.G. (Falata-Jalaba-Graba)

Sample posts:



Translation: “The falata, your people are cheap and can be bought by 2 cars.”



Translation: “Any foreigner in Sudan destroys the economy, unfortunately with the son of the homeland.”

Definition: The term is used in particular against migrants from the wider region to target them as non-Sudanese, and therefore of lower status and not deserving of the rights of a Sudanese citizen. It often has racial overtones if the person originated from an African or non-Arab country. Example: “This person is a foreigner--what does he know about Sudan? His country is Saudi Arabia / Abyssinia / Nigeria...” It may even be used against those who use local or native languages to communicate. Similarly, “you are not Sudanese” is targeted at those who live in Sudan’s border regions and who the speaker believes are not citizens simply based on their physical appearance. “Newcomers” is aimed at those who are believed to come from other countries, but who are seen as having done well financially at the expense of native Sudanese. “F.J.G.” is an acronym for “Falata-Jalaba-Graba. “Falata” is a tribe originating from West Africa; “Jalaba” is used to refer to northerners; and “Graba” refers to people from the west. The acronym is used to describe those bourgeoisie prospering in the west, who are not foreign-born, but who are not seen as indigenous to the regions where they are now living.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: It attempts to portray the person as an inferior being and not worthy of rights and protection due to their origins especially if they are dark-skinned. Since migrants often work in the informal economy and may lack legal status or protection, they are vulnerable to attacks. Whether foreign-born or non-indigenous, if they are seen as taking jobs away from host communities they are seen as a threat. Moreover, some also see them as responsible for “crime and moral turmoil” in society.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: None provided

29. ناس المعسكرات / Nas Almouaskarat / Camp people


Other spellings: None provided

Related references: لاجي / laje / Refugee; نازحين / Nazheen / Displaced people

Sample posts:



The image shows a screenshot of a tweet on a mobile device. The tweet is in Arabic and discusses the reasons why people in Darfur do not want to return to their homes. The text of the tweet is: "#الحاصل: في دارفور سكان المعسكرات لا يريدون العودة إلي ديارهم وقراهم والسبب العيشه مجان وكل شي مؤفرم عليهم شي سوي الإنجاب والتكاثر،،، الحركات المتمرده لا تريد سلاماً مع اي أحد لأنها تجد الدعم السخي المجان من اعداء السودان ومن دوله لدوله وامورهم ظابطه ود الحاصل لعشره سنين قادمه". Below the tweet is a "Translate Tweet" button and the timestamp "11:48 PM · Jun 11, 2020 · Twitter for Android". To the right of the tweet is an English translation: "Translation: "#What's going on: In Darfur people from the camps do not want to return to their house or village and the reason is because they live for free, and everything is in abundance and all they have to do is have children and reproduce...armed rebel groups don't want Peace with anyone because they have generous support from the enemies of Sudan from one country to another and this is what will happen for the next ten years."



Replying to [blurred]

والله الكلام دا حقيقة، ناس المعسكرات ما دايرين يرجعو لديارهم
عشان واحد يشتغل شغل شريف، لقو الاكل المجان. ولو قالو ليكم
الحقيقة تقولو دي عنصرية، وانتم عارفين الحقيقة لكن ملبدنها
وعايشين على المصالح التافهة الوسخة، تنادون بالسلام وانتم سبب
الدمار الحاصل في دارفور

[Translate Tweet](#)

7:13 AM · Jun 12, 2020 · [Twitter for Android](#)

Translation: “By God, these words are true. The people of the camps do not return home to do an honorable job. They can eat free food. And if they tell you the truth, you would say this is racism, and you know the truth, but its denial and living on petty and dirty interests, you call for peace, and you are the cause of the destruction in Darfur.”

Definition: This term refers to people living as refugees or displaced persons in camps or informal settlements due to conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, or elsewhere. Unless they are provided asylum, while they live within the country refugees have none of the rights and privileges of Sudanese citizens. Similarly, while displaced people may have lived in communities for years, they may not be accepted by indigenes. However, the term can be used to refer to someone seen as behaving like a “refugee,” that is, dependent, uneducated, uncivilized, and lacking rights.

Why this term is offensive/inflammatory: It is a term of exclusion indicating the targeted person is not from the area or country and doesn’t deserve what other Sudanese deserve. It also labels someone as living off the host country’s provisions perhaps in an ungrateful way. It stigmatizes these groups and ingrains feelings of displacement and marginalization in them. This is degrading, and these feelings may follow them their entire lives, even years after they have re-settled. Refugees are by definition vulnerable and targeting them as inferior to Sudanese puts them at risk.

Alternative word(s) that could be used: مواطنين من الأطراف / people from the peripheries; نازحين / displaced; ومهجرين قسرياً / refugees;

Additional Words or Phrases That Are Offensive and Inflammatory

A variety of validation activities were undertaken in person and remotely across Sudan in the late spring of 2020 to critique or validate the primary terms (see Appendices A and B). In the course of these activities, participants noted some terms from the survey that needed to be prioritized and identified new terms that were not included in the primary list for their validation. Given the limited scope of the workshops, there is less contextual information for these new terms.

Word or Phrase	Definition and Why it's Offensive and Inflammatory
عرب ظوط / Spot-on Bedouin	Bedouin are Arab tribes in the rural areas of Sudan that are marginalized relative to Arab Sudanese in the north. The term is used negatively to dehumanize the Bedouin as uncivilized and inferior.
فرخ / Chick	In rural, western parts of Sudan, this term refers to a child born out of wedlock. In other regions, it refers to a household servant, with the negative connotation of a slave. In both usages, it is used to stigmatize a person as either an outcast or inferior and lacking social status.
خاساوي / Khasawi / Khasa	The Khasa are a tribe believed to originate in Ethiopia and Eritrea and are now present in eastern Sudan, particularly Kassala. They are resented by others in eastern Sudan for their appearance and customs and are considered uncivilized. The term is used to negatively stereotype a whole group.
رطاني / Speaker of tribal dialect	This phrase is mainly used by ethnic Arab Sudanese against ethnic groups who primarily communicate using local dialects, in particular those groups that are seen as "African." It is intended to degrade or stigmatize the ethnic groups as inferior, and it spreads intolerance and division.
لحم راس / Meat head	The term refers to someone of mixed ethnicity or someone whose tribal origins are unknown and therefore suspect to the speaker. It is a term of denigration to characterize the targeted person as inferior and low class based on their ethnicity.

Appendix A: Methodology and Considerations

Scope and Design

For this project, PeaceTech Lab’s North America-based staff engaged two notable civil society organizations working in Sudan and the region: Andariya and SUDIA (Sudanese Development Initiative). The project team created a web-based survey so that Sudanese could respond with their experiences and insights about the phenomenon of online hate speech (as PeaceTech Lab has done in prior lexicons). More than 300 people responded to the survey administered by the two groups in late spring 2020. Once an initial analysis had been done, Andariya and SUDIA conducted a variety of workshops and interviews with participants throughout Sudan — primarily via online video-calls or by telephone to validate the lexicon’s findings. Finally, in July 2020, the team engaged a small group of Sudanese advisors to provide expert review of the draft lexicon.

Survey

The project team drafted the online survey. The design that was developed drew on surveys for prior lexicons to ensure respondents were able to provide multiple examples of offensive terms and phrases. As with prior surveys, the team decided to use the common phrase “offensive and inflammatory” in framing the survey questions rather than hate speech or dangerous speech. This decision was largely based on the fact that the survey’s primary goal was to have respondents identify specific terms that could inflame conflict rather than evaluate the variables of a particular framework. With this goal, the project team also intended to avoid prejudging or prequalifying the associations and dynamics that the respondents assigned to the terms. “Offensive and inflammatory” is a more readily understood threshold that reflects hate speech’s core meaning as conveying offense, as well as possible incitement to action or discrimination. If a term was seen merely as offensive, it would not rise to the threshold of inclusion; it also needed to be inflammatory. This research didn’t aim to determine the legality of identified terms in Sudanese law or international law, but rather the context by which the terms are offensive and inflammatory and might lead to violence.

For this lexicon, the project team undertook a variety of means of dissemination. Andariya and SUDIA distributed the survey through their networks, made it available on their respective Facebook pages, and included it in their newsletters. PeaceTech Lab also distributed the survey through its social media outlets. As with past lexicons, the team believed this reliance on the Sudanese groups’ networks would produce quality responses even if the respondents were not randomly selected. In the end, the survey achieved more than 300 responses.

Validation Workshops

Based on data from the survey, an initial draft analysis of the most frequently cited offensive and inflammatory terms was produced, including origins, meaning, and other contextual information. This draft was then critiqued or “validated” over the course of several days in a variety of workshops, meetings, and interviews undertaken by Andariya and SUDIA’s staff and facilitators specifically trained by Andariya and SUDIA for the assignment. Given the restrictions on movement across parts of Sudan due to the COVID-19 pandemic, these sessions occurred in video-calls, online calls, and by telephone, although a handful were able to take place face-to-face. Participants represented a number of cities and regions of Sudan. The workshops provided important clarification on the origins and usage of the terms, as well as contexts in which they were most potent while also unearthing new terms. Participants were also asked to characterize the terms as to how inflammatory the terms were perceived:

1. Attacks human dignity, is dehumanizing
2. Increases conflict and tensions but does not lead to direct actions or violence
3. Call to action/incitement/leads to violence/violent action

The inputs from this mix of activities were then incorporated into a new draft of the lexicon's most frequently cited terms.

Expert Advisors

The project called upon five Sudanese advisors to provide expert reviews of the full draft lexicon. These expert advisors were selected based on their expertise and represented different communities, genders, and professions. They contributed additional analysis and insights on the lexicon, helping to interpret local context and meanings as well as broader social and political trends.

Appendix B: List of Validation Workshops and Interviews

As indicated above, the initial data for this research was obtained through a survey administered by Andariya and SUDIA. In addition, both organizations undertook a variety of activities to validate the data and analysis produced from the survey. These activities included workshops, meetings, and in-depth interviews with experts which were conducted in-person as well as with online communication tools (e.g., Skype), WhatsApp, email, and mobile phones. The number of participants, number and type of activities, and the locations of the activities are indicated below.

SUDIA surveys and responses by region:

- 116 total responses
- Survey completion rate by region
 - Khartoum: 12%
 - Central: 14%
 - Darfur: 17%
 - Kordofan: 11%
 - Eastern Sudan: 28%
 - Northern Sudan: 18%

SUDIA validation workshops by region:

- two (2) in the Central Region (Blue Nile State)
- two (2) in the Darfur Region (South Darfur)
- two (2) in Kordofan (North Kordofan State)
- one (1) in the Eastern Region (Kassala State)

Andariya surveys and responses by region:

- 215 total responses (12 in English and 203 in Arabic)
- Location of respondents:
 - Khartoum
 - Darfur
 - Eastern Sudan
 - Northern Sudan
 - Central Sudan
 - Kordofan
 - Blue Nile

Andariya validation workshops with residents by location:

- One (1) in El Fasher
- One (1) in Dalang
- Three (3) in Khartoum

Andariya conducted in-depth interviews of three (3) experts based in Uganda (1) and Sudan (2).

Appendix C: Issues and Risks

During the course of the research for this lexicon, which took place from March 2020 to July 2020, the project team encountered a variety of issues and risks that it sought to mitigate.

Constraints on Research During a Political Transition

The ouster of former president Omer al-Bashir in April 2019 ushered in a transitional period full of protest as well as negotiation over institutions, governance, and justice for Sudan. A transitional government was agreed to in August 2019 which would run the country for three years, after which elections would be held. There are many outstanding issues to be addressed, including resolving internal conflicts, justice for past crimes, as well as killings during the 2018-2019 protests, in addition to re-starting the hard-hit economy. As this project got under way in 2020, negotiations between civilian and military representatives were ongoing on all these issues while protests or rallies took place from Darfur to Khartoum and people endured both lengthy power cuts and sheltering at home due to the COVID-19 virus. These dynamics affected the environment in which the research was done as well as limited the practicality of some of the communications due to power and connectivity cuts. However, there were no known partial or full Internet shutdowns or throttling during the research period. While Sudan remains under some international censure for human rights violations and terrorism, the repeal of US sanctions announced in 2017 finally came into effect in April 2020;²⁴ this will allow Sudanese companies and institutions access to global finance and services which should eventually lead to greater availability of technology tools and information services. Finally, while it is difficult to ascertain, the fluid nature of the political situation may have made participants less or more likely to share information on sensitive topics.

Impact of COVID-19

This research project took place during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) global pandemic. While the US has been leading the world in cases and deaths, Sudan has had a significant outbreak with more than 9,000 cases and nearly 600 deaths confirmed by authorities as of late June 2020.²⁵ As the project got under way, US-based project team members were under stay-at-home orders; the Sudan-based partners were subsequently restricted as well (although to differing degrees) in the country. The most immediate impact was that meetings, particularly for the validation workshops, had to be done mostly in remote or virtual fashion. This likely had an impact on the quality of the data since partners indicated that Sudanese, like many people, prefer face-to-face discussions rather than virtual meetings. In addition, turnout for some workshops was less than expected likely due to COVID-19 as well as to the political climate; this was especially evident in Khartoum, where lockdowns were in effect and permits were needed for transit between areas, and in El Fasher, where an afternoon curfew was in effect. The team addressed this challenge for the surveys by increasing the variety of means used to disseminate the survey, which included email, newsletters, and a dedicated location on the partners' respective Facebook pages, as well as PeaceTech Lab pushing the survey out in its own social media communications. Similarly, the team addressed this concern by utilizing tools such as Skype for the validation workshops, and email and WhatsApp for communications and submitting data. Interestingly, project partner SUDIA reported that the fact that the survey data collection occurred during Ramadan observances likely contributed to increased participation in the survey as respondents were at home with time and communications devices available.

Limited Accessibility of Internet and Limitations on Availability of and Familiarity with Information Communication Technologies (ICTs)

Full and reliable Internet connectivity was often problematic, and since many aspects of the data collection and validation were done remotely, this affected monitoring of remote workshops and caused delays in communications and data analysis and transfer, among other challenges. As importantly, many of the participants in the survey and workshops did not have significant experience or exposure to advanced communications tools. For example, lack of familiarity with SurveyMonkey or similar templates may have affected the quality of some users' survey inputs, and lack of access to Zoom or similar tools may have affected the facilitation of the remote workshops. Indeed, these limitations added to the challenge of not being able to meet face-to-face as many Sudanese prefer (especially on important or sensitive topics). Therefore, as indicated above, a variety of tools (Skype, email, telephone, WhatsApp) were used to address varying user knowledge and capabilities as well as (in some cases) in-person surveys and in-depth telephone interviews. In some settings, such as in El Fasher, participants were younger and had greater familiarity with such ICT tools, while in other locations such as Dalang, there was less familiarity. The local partners and their facilitators addressed these challenges by spending more time on the calls to explain and guide the activities. The facilitators also did follow up calls to ensure that participants understood the project and objectives as well as to ensure the accuracy of the views and information that participants provided.

Limited Access to Affected Populations

Research that is focused on online hate speech runs the risk of attracting participants who are savvy online consumers, but who may not be fully representative of those affected by such speech. The project team first aimed to avoid this problem by ensuring that the local partners had significant reach inside the country. In addition, the project team designed the research to ensure a broad mix of regions were represented and that multiple layers of responses, especially with the workshops, were obtained (See Appendix B). In this way, the project avoided a Khartoum-centric approach and resulting urban elite-heavy perspective. As an example, SUDIA ensured a broad participant representation, including internally displaced persons, a mix of genders and ages, and farmers (who were often called in the evening after returning from work).

Limitations Regarding Language and Translations

While Sudan now recognizes Arabic and English as official languages, the project team needed to ensure that the project, methodology, and substance were clearly understood by participants in Sudan (especially given the sensitive topic). PeaceTech Lab staff bolstered their Arabic language capability with a project advisor who was a native Sudanese and also a peacebuilding expert. This expert translated and transliterated the survey and its data for analysis by the project team, and similarly advised on guidance for the validation workshops as well as the inputs from them. Project partners SUDIA and Andariya also deployed their multi-lingual teams to translate and explain the responses from the workshops. Finally, the expert reviewers who were engaged in the final stage of the process also evaluated the Arabic terms, meanings, and context (albeit at a later stage). By having multiple reviewers of the language, the project team believes the views of participants were properly conveyed and able to be analyzed, and that the analysis was similarly vetted to ensure accuracy and understanding to the best degree possible.

Limitations Regarding Project Methodology and Hate Speech Concepts

As PeaceTech Lab has noted in previous lexicons, methodologies for identifying and analyzing hate speech in any country context are relatively new and are undergoing continuous improvement. Thus, they are in need not only of testing and refining but also elucidating and explaining — not least before and involving the people they aim to serve. As Sudan is in a profound social and political transition from 30 years of authoritarian rule, hate speech and language in general often reflect the flux of social change. While institutions and legislation are under review in many areas of Sudanese life — indeed, there is news of proposed legislation on hate speech — there is currently no legal definition of hate speech in Sudan. Historically, the media has been state-owned or state-affiliated, and press councils and associations closely monitored and influenced by the state.²⁶ Therefore, public discussion of hate speech and the issues that drive it have been missing with the result that broad public awareness of hate speech concepts is lacking. Indeed, there was anecdotal evidence that some participants were unable to differentiate between slander and hate speech, while in other cases, terms that were seen as obvious hate speech by many participants were dismissed as socially accepted conversation by others. The project aimed to pre-empt this challenge by hosting a large training meeting of workshop facilitators at the outset most of whom were selected based on past peacebuilding experience. In other locations, such as Darfur, there was concern and anxiety over the topic; facilitators attempted to assuage concerns and offer empathy by providing extra clarity, using humor when helpful, and relating other experiences which helped establish trust.

PeaceTech Lab's approach to hate speech seeks to identify the words and phrases being used and their context in order to understand the dynamics that make them inflammatory. Thus, the team uses the phrase "offensive and inflammatory" as a threshold to guide survey respondents/workshop participants, monitors, and expert advisers — and users of this publication — in assessing such speech. The terms are then considered on the basis of how offensive and inflammatory when evaluated on a continuum (see Methodology and Considerations above). In this way, the team aims to avoid the tendency among respondents to want to offer legalistic definitions but instead allow for the complexity of origins and meaning and the dynamic nature of language.

Endnotes

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ABOUT PEACE TECH LAB

PeaceTech Lab works for individuals and communities affected by conflict, using technology, media, and data to accelerate local peacebuilding efforts. An independent non-profit organization, the Lab's mission is to amplify the power of peacetechnology to save lives through earlier warnings and smarter responses to violence. The Lab's programs emphasize a data-driven, cross-sector approach, engaging everyone from student engineers and citizen journalists to Fortune 500 companies in scaling the impact of peacetechnology.

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